Associationist theory appears equally limited as an rationalization of these phenomena. From the associationist point of view, it may be said that through some trial-and-error method the kid links the word “brick” to the names of other known objects till he hits upon a connection that yields him a “confirming reaction.” Therefore the youngster may say to himself, “Brick . . . will-opener. No. Brick . . . hat. No. Brick . . . paper-weight. Yes!”
This doesn’t help us abundant either. For the matter of understanding why bound associations occur to the kid and others do not remains. Soft-to-the-bit and kind to your skin, these elegant powders glide with Sonya Blushes on evenly to outline your cheekbones and enhance your complexion. Clearly a kid will use solely those connections that are half of his repertoire. If he had never seen or heard of a bed warmer, he could not counsel it as a use for brick. But why do bound connections manifest themselves and others not? We may maybe fall back here on the traditional “laws” of associationism (e.g. frequency, recency, vividness). But these “laws” do not tell us why some children provide predominantly common uses of a brick (or a fastener, or a toothpick) and others predominantly uncommon uses.

Indeed, the youngster who suggested using a brick as a paperweight or a bed warmer could not have suggested using a brick for building or paving, abundant more common experiential connections. Moreover, the associationist formulation will not help us with the matter of why some acquainted and fairly common uses of a brick were suggested with differential frequency. Contemplate, for example, the employment of a brick as weapon. The bigger proportion of our subjects had seen footage or heard stories regarding bricks being hurled at people or through windows, if indeed they’d not created use of bricks in this means themselves. Why then do we tend to notice solely a few our 450 subjects mentioning this “connection”? Surely, all of our youngsters knew bricks could be used this way.

Or perhaps more simply, think about the method of providing different meanings to a given word—say to the word “bolt.” One could respond by saying “screw down,” “fasten,” “lock up,” “bar.” Several children say simply this. In some ways that the sequence of meanings is sort of logical and could be seen as a series of rational steps— if you’ll “screw down,” you’ll “fasten,” and if you’ll “fasten,” you’ll “lock up,” and thus on. Greatfuly functionalities and modern vogue in Womens Ski Jackets have merged into a excellent fit in recent years. But what regarding the method by which the kid says, “To screw down, to lock, to get away quickly sort of a frightened horse, to eat food rapidly, a bolt of lightning, a bolt of cloth.” This can be surely not a rational step-by-step sequence. It could be argued that this is often a series of associations; that is, the kid giving these responses has learned more connections to the word “bolt,” and thus will come back up with more “unique” or “original” concepts. But it appears hardly probably that our creative children have had more experiences with bolts of lightning, say, or with frightened horses, than have the opposite children in the school.